Entrepreneurial Networking in China and Russia: Comparative Analysis and Implications for Western Executives by Batjargal, Bat
   
 
 
THE WILLIAM DAVIDSON INSTITUTE 
AT THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN BUSINESS SCHOOL 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Entrepreneurial Networking in China and Russia: 
Comparative Analysis and Implications for Western Executives  
 
 
By: Bat Batjargal 
 
William Davidson Working Paper Number 520 
December 2002    
 
ENTREPRENEURIAL NETWORKING IN CHINA AND RUSSIA:  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN EXECUTIVES 
 
 
 
 
BAT BATJARGAL
* 
 
Stanford University 
Building 40 
Main Quad 
Stanford, CA 94305-2006 
 
Guanghua School of Management 
Peking University 
Beijing, 100871 
People’s Republic of China 
 
Batjargal_bat@yahoo.com 
 
 
 
 
 
Abstract 
In this article, I compare personal networks of Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs in 
terms of network structure, relationships and resources accessed in networks. The 
Chinese data is composed of longitudinal phone interviews with 94 Internet entrepreneurs 
in Beijing, and the Russian data is comprised of longitudinal face-to-face interviews with 
75 entrepreneurs in Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk. Implications for Western 
executives are discussed. 
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ENTREPRENEURIAL NETWORKING IN CHINA AND RUSSIA:  
COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR WESTERN EXECUTIVES 
 
There is a growing recognition among scholars of the vital role entrepreneurs play 
in wealth creation in transition economies by skillfully navigating unstable political, 
economic and regulatory environments in those countries.
1 Entrepreneurs find that an 
effective strategy for success is to do business through personal networks of relationships 
because network members provide information, resources, social support, and help to 
find clients, suppliers and investors who are socially bound.
2  
In this article, I compare the way in which Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs 
build and maintain personal networks for entrepreneurial success and suggest practical 
implications for Western executives for establishing and maintaining ties with Chinese 
and Russian entrepreneurs. I will base my descriptions of entrepreneurs’ networks on two 
interview data of Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs. The Chinese data is composed of 
longitudinal phone-interviews with 94 Internet entrepreneurs in Beijing in 2001 and 
2002, and the Russian data is longitudinal face-to-face interviews with 75 entrepreneurs 
in three cities including Moscow in 1995 and 1999.  
This article is structured as follows. The next section examines similarities and 
differences between China and Russia, and the Chinese and Russians. It is followed by 
the methods section where I describe the sample and data collection. After that I compare 
Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs in terms of network structure, relations and resources 
in networks. Finally, the section “implications for Western executives” describes 
suggestions for effective networking in China and Russia.    
China versus Russia: Similarities and Differences 
 
The historical, institutional and economic similarities and contrasts between 
China and Russia, and cultural and social differences of the Chinese and Russians serve 
as macro environmental conditions that have profound influences on the way in which 
individual Russian and Chinese entrepreneurs build, maintain and expand their personal 
networks over time. I therefore discuss these issues as general background for 
comparative analysis of Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs’ networking.   
China and Russia: Similarities 
The People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation share common 
geographic, historical and institutional heritages. The two countries have long land 
borders, and the climate in Russian Siberia is similar to the climate in Western and 
Northern regions of China. Much of Eastern and Southern China resembles Southern 
Russia where mild climate and low land terrain dominates. Both China and Russia were 
under the Mongol rule for several centuries, and some historians conclude that one reason 
for contemporary authoritarianism in the two countries is the shared historical heritage of 
the Mongol dominance.
3 The main institutional similarity between two countries is the 
totalitarian political system. While this system lasted in the Soviet Union and Russia for 
70 years, it still exists in China. Although there are important differences between the 
Russian workers’ revolution in 1917 and the Chinese peasant uprising in 1949, the 
communist institutional structure-the core feature of which is the total dominance by the 
communist party in the political, economic and cultural lives of these societies-is by and 
large similar.  
    
China and Russia: Differences 
  Despite the heritage of communist revolutions, China and Russia currently have 
distinct political systems. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Russia 
painstakingly pursued the road of liberal democracy, and whatever deficiencies and 
setbacks of the Russian democratic experience, the country is a liberal democracy.
4 In 
contrast, the Chinese communist party has further consolidated its power by taking 
advantage of impressive economic performance in the last two decades.
5 The result is that 
the Russians enjoy relative political freedom and free speech but face unprecedented 
economic hardships, whereas the Chinese are experiencing rapid improvements in living 
standards in “exchange” for limited political freedom. 
  The Soviet and Chinese leadership had embraced strikingly different methods of 
economic reform in the early 1980s. Russia has chosen the so-called “Big-ban” or shock 
therapy approach, which introduced rapid economic liberalization and privatization of 
state enterprises on a large scale.
6 Although there is no consensus among economists in 
assessments of the Russian economic reforms, it should be noticed that the Gorbachev 
economic reforms and economic policies of the Russian government to date are widely 
regarded as a failure. This is in a sharp contrast to China, which rose to become the 
world’s 6
th largest economy from a poor agricultural economy in only 20 years. The main 
success factor for the spectacular economic growth in China has been the path of the 
gradual economic reform, the essence of which is controlled liberalization and dualist 
sectoral approach.
7    
 
 
 
Table 1. China versus Russia: Country Characteristics 
 
 China 
 
Russia 
Political system 
 
Communist Liberal  democracy 
Dominant religion  Confucianism, 
Buddhism 
The Eastern Orthodox 
Christianity 
Population (Millions, 2000) 
 
1,261 146 
Gross domestic product 
(Millions of dollars 2000) 
1,079,954 251,092 
Average annual GDP growth % 
1990-2000 
10,3 -4,8 
Value added as % of GDP  Agriculture 16 
Industry 49 
Services 34 
Agriculture 7 
Industry 38 
Services 56 
Exports (Millions of dollars 
2000) 
249,212 105,200 
Imports (Millions of dollars 
2000) 
225,097 44.200 
High technology exports (% of 
manufactured exports 1999) 
17 16 
Foreign direct investment 
(Millions of dollars 1999) 
38,753 3,309 
Domestic credit provided by 
banking sector (% of GDP 
2000) 
132,7 23,9 
External debt (present value % 
of GNI 1999) 
14 72 
Source: The World Bank, 2002. Building Institutions for Markets, World Development Report, 
Oxford University Press.    
  The Chinese and Russian governments have carried out different administrative 
restructuring policies, which have resulted in distinctive institutional environments. 
Following the core requirement of liberal democracy, Russia decentralized political 
power in the country and introduced a free election system. This policy shifted much of 
political power from the center- Moscow to regional and local governments, allowing 
local elites to “hijack” the newly found autonomy.
8 The Russian central government tried 
to control regions and provinces fiscally through a new taxation system but the policy 
resulted in tremendous institutional chaos. Russia thus carried out unsuccessful political 
decentralization and fiscal federalism.
9 
By contrast, the Chinese institutional reform is a success story: the Communist 
Party of China meticulously transferred power in areas of economy, education and 
culture to non-party bureaucracies and further consolidated its absolute dominance of 
political institutions, i.e., legislature, ministries, local governments, judiciary, media, 
security forces and military. While the political control over government and public 
organizations has strengthened for the last decade, fiscal reform and decentralization has 
enabled the Chinese economy to grow in double digits for two decades.
10 In this way, 
China remains a politically centralized but fiscally decentralized country. 
The Chinese versus the Russians 
  As two peoples who occupy large parts of the Eurasian landmass, the Chinese and 
Russian people have distinct cultural, religious and cognitive traditions, which 
significantly influence their network building and maintaining behaviors.
11 While the 
Russians are Eastern Orthodox Christians, the Chinese are predominantly Confucian in 
their religious beliefs. At the end of the tenth century the Russians began to adopt the    
Eastern form of Christianity and the Russian Orthodox Communion based in Moscow 
became the most influential and extensive church with the fall of Constantinople to the 
Turks in 1453.
12 Roughly two and a half thousand years ago, Confucius, the most 
influential Chinese thinker, created an internally consistent yet simple system of ideas 
that is called Confucianism.  
While the core concept in Christianity is agape, which evolved from Israelite 
tradition, the cornerstone of Confucianism is the concept called jen. The meanings of 
agape and jen are similar in the sense that both refer to love. However, agape defines the 
relationship between Christians and their God and jen refers to the relationship between 
Confucians and their ideal, and between Confucians and their fellow human beings. 
Therefore, the fundamental difference between Christianity including the Orthodox 
Church and Confucianism is that the former is a theocentric religion with agape as 
divinity and the latter is a humanistic religion with jen as humanity.
13  
After the collapse of the Soviet regime that promoted atheistic ideology, the 
Orthodox Church has revived its activities and became an influential force in country’s 
spiritual life.
14 In fact, roughly half of Russia’s population regards itself as believers 
though less than 10 percent are regular churchgoers.
15 Even during the communist 
regime, the Russian culture has kept its Christian flavor and Russophile trends.
16 In 
contrast, the official ideology in China is Marxism, Leninism and Mao Zedong 
philosophy, which stifles religious freedom and forbids religious practices. There is, 
therefore, no reliable evidence of religiosity of the Chinese. Qualitative evidence, 
however, suggest that there is a certain nostalgia for Confucianism among Chinese    
intelligentsia, emphasis of the humane spirit of Confucianism and resurgence of 
traditional beliefs and practices such as fengshui in China.
17 
Religions have profound influence on emotions and behaviors of peoples. 
Important types of moral emotions are shame defined as global negative evaluations of 
the self (i.e., Who I am?) and guilt defined as articulated condemnation of a specific 
behavior (i.e., What I did?).
18 Although shame and guilt are universal emotions, they are 
experienced differently by peoples whose religion, culture and customs are different. The 
Russians and the Chinese differ in experiencing shame and guilt. Because the Orthodox 
Christianity emphasizes the relationship between Christians and their God, guilt as 
“private” experience arising from self-generated pangs of conscience is likely to regulate 
moral behaviors of the Russians more than shame. On the contrary, shame as “public” 
emotion arising from public exposure and disapproval of some shortcoming or 
transgression is likely to regulate moral behaviors of the Chinese more than guilt since 
the relationship between fellow humans are the spiritual reference point in Confucianism. 
Embedded in the Confucian philosophy, the national psyche of the Chinese 
sharply differs from the Russians’ mindset. Postulates such as the universe and man’s life 
are real, all forms of change are expressions of two forces, the yin and the yang, changes 
take place in the form of cycles or spirals rather than extremes are fundamental 
metaphysics of the Chinese thinking. The Chinese do not believe in supernatural forces 
and are inclined to think concretely rather than abstractly. Understanding is based on 
appreciation and liking rather than analysis and calculations.
19  
The Russians in contrast are keen abstract thinkers and transcendental 
considerations have great place in their psyche. The Russians have a tendency to alternate    
between extreme positions and may occupy two or more mutually exclusive mental 
positions simultaneously. The Russians can be broad yet narrow, reckless yet cautious, 
tolerant yet censorious, freedom loving yet slavish, and in this way, they will be found in 
all directions at some time or other.
20 The Russians have no precise and concrete notions 
of time and space, and therefore, their mindset seems to be “shapeless” in terms of time 
and space.
21 
Methods 
The Chinese sample and data 
  The Chinese data is composed of structured telephone interviews with 94 Internet 
entrepreneurs in July-August 2001, and follow-up interviews with 41 original 
respondents in August-September 2002. All interviews were conducted in Beijing. In 
2001, we created a list of 410 Internet related firms (Internet service providers, Internet 
content providers, e-commerce, network technology, software) based in Beijing. We used 
the China Internet Network Information Center’s survey reports, web-sites of Sina.com 
and Sohu.com, China yellow pages, and the web-site of the Beijing Administration for 
Industry and Commerce as sample sources. 
  In all, we contacted 120 CEOs selecting every-third on the list, and 98 agreed to 
be interviewed. The positive response rate is 81 percent. Four respondents were 
unavailable for actual interviews. After one-year interval, we re-interviewed 41 
respondents, and the remaining 53 firms were either non-existent or unreachable, or 
refused to be re-interviewed.
22 We used the Burt name-generation method to collect data 
on network structure, relations and resources. In addition, we asked questions about self-
perceived social skills (renji jiao wang) and networking skills (guanxixue), and    
performance indicators such as revenue, access to venture capital, and legitimacy 
building.  
I carried out 10 in-depth, semi-structured interviews with CEOs of eNet China, Hi 
China web solutions, Chuangshi tengfei company, Hi China, Yabuy.com, Read online, 
Welan.com, and Beijing Hi-World software technology company from May 2001 to July 
2002. Three experts who conduct research on Internet industry in China were interviewed 
in September-October 2002.  
The Russian sample and data 
I interviewed 75 Russian entrepreneurs in February-June 1995 and carried out 
follow-up interviews with 56 original respondents in March-May 1999. Pilot interviews 
with six Moscow entrepreneurs were conducted in August 1994. The sample includes 
firms in three Russian cities, i.e. Moscow, Ekaterinburg and Petrozavodsk, from four 
industries, i.e., banking, trade, manufacturing and the resource sector. It also covers large, 
medium and small firms, and new ventures versus privatized firms. 
  In 1995, I selected firms on the basis of stratified random sampling procedure in 
three cities. I used computerized databases of registered businesses of the Moscow City 
Committee of Statistics, Business Assistance Center of the Sverdlovsk Regional 
Administration in Ekaterinburg and the State Committee of Statistics of the Republic of 
Karelia in Petrozavodsk as sample populations. I created twelve lists of firms (four 
industries and three sizes) each of which contained twenty firm names. In 1995, I 
contacted 120 entrepreneurs selecting every second on the list and 82 agreed to be 
interviewed. The response rate was 68 percent. Seven respondents were discovered as 
ineligible in the field, so that the final sample consisted of 75 entrepreneurs and directors.    
There were 50 new ventures and 25 privatized companies. After four years of first wave 
interviews, I re-interviewed 56 original respondents.
23 I used the position generation 
technique to collect data on network structure, relationships and resources of 
entrepreneurs.
24 
Chinese Entrepreneurs versus Russian Entrepreneurs 
Chinese Guanxi and Russian Svyazi  
Social origins of Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs have both similarities and 
differences. The Chinese entrepreneurs predominantly came from four social classes: 
individual households (38 percent), cadres in party, state bureaucracy and enterprises (24 
percent), peasantry (17 percent), and personnel in trade and services (11 percent).
25 In 
contrast, most Russian entrepreneurs were middle managers and engineers in enterprises 
(40 percent), professionals such as doctors, teachers and academics (25 percent), senior 
cadres in party, state bureaucracy and enterprises (20 percent), and others (15 percent).
26 
Initial social structures (e.g. the vast majority of the Chinese population are rural peasants 
whereas Russia is a largely industrialized nation), divergent economic reform paths, and 
social mobility patterns caused by marketization of two economies may explain 
differences in social compositions of the Russian and Chinese entrepreneurial classes. 
  Informal social relationships were important resources for Chinese and Russian 
entrepreneurs ever since economic reforms were embarked. This is consistent with 
findings in advanced economies.
27 In the 1980s and 90s, private entrepreneurs in China 
were engaged in particularistic relationships with local governments (“wearing a red 
hat”), foreign firms (“wearing a foreign hat”), and other small firms (“wearing a small 
hat”) to gain access to production facilities, raw materials, and importantly, political    
protection.
28 Similar evidence has been found in the Russian case: entrepreneurial 
networks comprised of many weak ties and resourceful contacts lead to higher revenue 
growth and profitability.
29 
  The indigenous social phenomenon called guanxi (connections) is the Chinese 
version of social networks.
30 Although there is some debate about many nuances of 
guanxi, there is an agreement among scholars on its main meaning: guanxi is 
interpersonal relationships that facilitate social exchange. Guanxi has been interpreted as 
family relationships, utilitarian ties, and particularistic ties embedded in Confucian 
values.
31 Researchers found that guanxi relationships promote interpersonal trust, 
facilitate job mobility, and enhance firm performance.
32  
  The Russian version of social networks is svyazi (connections).
33 A formal 
description of social networks in the Russian context is social seti.
34 The concept of blat 
has been used widely to describe informal relationships in the Soviet and Russian 
context.
35 Although it is accurate to employ the term blat to capture informal practices in 
the Soviet context, it may be imprecise to denote social networks as a generic 
phenomenon by blat for several reasons. The word blat originated from criminal slogans 
in late XIX century in St. Petersburg. The original as well as contemporary meaning of 
blat is criminal and criminal underground world.
36 The term therefore has an extreme 
negative connotation, and is used less frequently by the Russians today. Most Russians 
prefer a neutral word svyazi to refer to social networks.
37 Svyazi capital reduces 
uncertainties and risks in financial transactions, facilitates access to resources and loans, 
and enables Russian entrepreneurs to increase their sales and profits.
38    
 
 
Table 2. Relative Differences between Chinese and Russian  
Entrepreneurs’ Networks 
 
Network features  Chinese networks 
 
Russian networks 
Generic term  guanxi  svyazi 
Size  Roughly same  Roughly same 
Density Higher  Lower 
Structural holes  Fewer  More 
Diversity Less  Greater 
Homophily Greater  Less 
Relational base  Important  Less important 
Relational hierarchy  Based on role obligations  Based on power and status 
Centrality  Skillful being central  Less skillful 
Dyadic ties 
 
Intense and multi-content  Less intense and more 
compartmentalized by 
segments 
Triad ties 
 
More effective and many 
control mechanisms 
Less effective and fewer 
control mechanisms 
Dynamics  More stable  Less stable 
Strong ties  More  Fewer 
Weak ties  Fewer  More 
Interpersonal trust  Higher  Lower 
Degree of 
personalization 
Greater 
 
Lower 
Tie formation 
 
Effective through a trusted 
intermediary 
Direct approach is effective
Reciprocity Higher  Lower 
Rituals and symbols  Highly ritualistic Less  ritualistic 
Government officials  Resource-rich Resource-poor 
Relations with police 
and security agencies 
Less important  Important for protection 
from mafia 
Dark side 
 
Skillful in intrigues 
Strong favoritism 
Relational trap is 
sophisticated 
Less skillful in intrigues 
Weaker favoritism 
Relational trap is primitive 
Relational inertia 
 
Greater Less 
    
Network Structure 
Field interviews seem to suggest that Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs do not 
differ much in terms of personal network size.
39 However, other structural properties of 
networks such as density, diversity and internal hierarchy seem to differ sharply. The 
Chinese entrepreneurs’ guanxi networks appear to be denser and contain fewer structural 
holes, i.e., disconnected contacts, than Russians’ svyazi networks probably due to the 
cultural inclinations of the Chinese to prefer fewer yet trusted particularistic ties. Personal 
networks (guanxiwang) of the Chinese entrepreneurs are composed of more family 
members, classmates and friends who know each other for extended periods of time. 
Thus, the well-articulated concept “guanxi base” seems to hold true empirically.
40 In 
contrast, relational base does not seem to play an important role for Russians’ 
networking, and this feature makes their networks less dense containing more structural 
holes. It may be speculated that the Chinese benefit from coherent and close networks of 
ties whereas the Russians enjoy less coherent and looser networks of ties containing 
many structural holes.
41 
  Networks of the Russian entrepreneurs are more diverse in terms of tie 
characteristics such as demography, industry and occupational status than guanxi 
networks of the Chinese. Multiple social recruitment sources, e.g., beyond family and 
classmates, the general social chaos that occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union, 
and many vaguely defined weak relationships make Russian networks heterophilous. 
High homophily of Chinese networks is consistent with the dense and controlled features 
of their networks.     
 Chinese  guanxi networks are more hierarchical than Russians’ seti. The Chinese 
have a strong sense of role obligations (lun) between members of their networks (e.g., 
parent-child relationship), and are more inclined to “place” members according to the 
formal hierarchy.
42 Although one may observe internal hierarchies in Russian networks, 
these are based more on status, power and wealth of network members rather than on role 
obligations or demographic characteristics such as age or gender, as in the Chinese case. 
  Field interviews suggest that the Chinese entrepreneurs are more aware of being 
central in their networks and benefit from various intermediary actions and roles than the 
Russians are. A Chinese entrepreneur appears as a skillful networker and shrewd 
manipulator who knows and practices well the ancient Chinese art of networking – 
guanxixue.
43 An ability to generate more social “receivables” than “payables” and “milk” 
relationships for instrumental and emotional gain is a crucial benefit to being central in 
one’s networks. By contrast, the Russians have not yet the articulated “art” of 
networking, and networking is seen as a set of practical actions for establishing and 
maintaining ties. 
  Chinese dyadic (two-person) ties are more particularistic contingent on the 
relational base and require frequent interactions and intense efforts to maintain 
relationships. Dyadic ties in the Chinese context can be multi-content, i.e., a single 
relationship fulfils various functions including an instrumental benefit, access to 
information and knowledge, or political protection. Two-person relationships in Russia 
are less particularistic and intense, and they do not usually require frequent tie re-
activation once some kind of relationship has been established. In this way, the rate of  
“bridge decay” is faster in China. Chinese dyadic ties are more costly to establish and    
maintain in terms of time, resources and commitment. As a result, the two sides in a 
Chinese dyadic relationship are more motivated to mobilize resources for each other 
making dyadic ties more effective and trustworthy than in Russia. 
  Chinese and Russian triads (three-person relationships) differ in terms of mutual 
expectations, social control mechanisms, and symbolic aspects of interactions. The 
central actor in the Chinese triangle is more powerful and has many social leverages to 
influence behaviors of triad members than the central player in the Russian troika.
44 For 
example, gaining and saving face – mianzi - plays a vital role in regulating relationships 
between triad members in the Chinese context. In Russia, there is no such social and 
psychological concept to regulate the social behavior of individuals and groups. Social 
sanctions or “punishments” are more effective in the Chinese triads because mianzi 
serves as a social currency that has a definite value. In addition, the Chinese are likely to 
have higher expectations and show more conformist behaviors in triple relationships for 
cultural reasons. 
  Although the two studies employed different methods, they suggest that Chinese 
networks are more stable over time both in terms of changes in structural properties and 
membership turnover compared to Russian networks.
45 The Chinese are more 
conservative socially, have greater relational inertia defined as a tendency to stick to the 
same social ties over time, and are motivated to preserve existing relationships since ties 
generate acceptable net returns. 
Relational Aspect of Networks 
Differences in the way in which networks function is more evident in relational 
aspects because they involve concrete individuals and groups rather than abstract    
structures. Relational origins in Chinese and Russian entrepreneurial networks are 
different in some ways yet similar in other ways. In China, guanxi bases or origins 
include family, hometown, same surname, ethnicity, gender, same school including 
university, same organization – danwei -, and shared experience, e.g., - hai gui 
entrepreneurs.
46 Russian entrepreneurs do not pay attention to relational origins as much 
as the Chinese do. However, there are factors that initiate or “pull” relationships in 
Russia: same college, ethnicity, gender and shared experience may well be a reason for 
social “hook-ups”. For example, classmates (odnoklassnik) and Soviet Army experience, 
including the Afghan war veterans-Afganets, are common bases for Russian svyazi. 
Chinese relationships are multi-layered in terms of strong and weak ties, and 
boundaries between strong and weak relationships are gradual and nuanced. By contrast, 
differences between strong and weak ties in Russia are clear-cut and tangible in terms of 
trust, instrumental mobilization and emotional closeness. 
Guanxi ties are intensely personalized and there is no clear separation of personal 
and professional guanxi in China. Russian networks are less personalized, and there are 
personal (lichnye) and business (delovye) segments within network clusters. In addition, 
the Russians tend to keep a greater distance in interpersonal relationships than the 
Chinese. For example, the word blat might be used to refer to instrumental ties whereas 
terms such as svoi or tusovka are used to separate a close circle of friends from job 
related contacts.
47 
Both the Russians and Chinese are trustworthy and distrustful in different ways. 
The Chinese are trustful of their family members and close friends and distrustful of 
those whom they do not know more than the Russians. The Chinese generally trust those    
who have been recommended to them by a trustworthy source- a family member or close 
friend - because information diffusion and re-enforcing mechanisms are more effective in 
guanxi clusters than in Russian svyazi networks.
48 For example, the following 
conversation with CEO of a Chinese Internet platform provider-firm supports this 
assertion (Author’s interview, April 2002, Beijing): 
CEO: I met Wang at a private party hosted by a friend. My friend and Wang were 
classmates in the School of the Communist Party of China… It was a risky decision to 
sign such a large contract with him because his firm does not specialize in a type of 
digital image equipment, which we were looking for. I also was worried that they can not 
customize their products to our needs because all our clients are Chinese firms. 
 
Author: Why did you then sign the contract? 
CEO: Well, it is complicated… It was cheaper although there were issues on quality side. 
And the guy appeared honest and trustworthy. I verified that with my friend who knows 
him well… 
 
In this way, interpersonal trust is more “transferable” in China. In addition, the 
Chinese are more skillful in establishing well-defined exchange rules and ruthlessly 
punishing “social criminals”. An effective way to cultivate trust in China is to use a 
“trusted” intermediary. Direct trust-building can be effective but it will take longer and 
require more fine-tuned efforts from both sides. 
The Russians do trust their family members but clan-type relationships do not 
exist in Russia. Unlike the Chinese, Russians are less trustful of third parties even if a 
trusted intermediary has recommended that person. A successful Russian banker said in 
an interview (Author’s interview, May 1999, Moscow): 
Banker: … nowdays it is difficult to trust (doveryat’) people when everybody tries to out 
maneuver or screw up others… 
 
Author: Even your friends? 
    
Banker: Sometimes. 
 
Author: How about friends of friends? 
 
Banker: Oh, worse… I prefer to deal (imet’ delo) with those whom I know well. 
 
The Russian practice of “I am from Alexandr Alexandrovich” thus applies to 
instrumental actions rather than intimate trust cultivation. The Russians prefer to establish 
direct personal relationships since triad ties are perceived risky in the chaotic and crisis-
driven environment. Direct communications are more effective for trust-building in 
Russia. 
Reciprocity is a core feature of personal relationships both in Russia and China. 
The Chinese notion renching (human obligation) refers to a well-articulated set of 
expectations, exchange norms and informal re-enforcing devices.
49 The Russian concept 
vzaimnost’ is simpler, less universal and often ignored in relationships. Therefore, the 
Russians have to rely more on “mechanical” monitoring techniques, and this leads to 
higher cost in terms of re-enforcement of social obligations. 
Various symbols and rituals play important roles in Chinese and Russian 
networks. Gaining, giving, saving and losing face are recognized symbolic interactions in 
Confucian cultures. Highly ritualistic interactions such as gift giving, social dining and 
tea sessions are prevalent routines in guanxi relationships.
50 There are many indirect 
signals and “silent messages” in guanxi practice. The Russians are less ritualistic but 
there are important symbolic routines such as gift giving (podarki), vodka sessions, and 
tea drinking (chai pitie) and going to Russian banya (bathhouse).
51 
  The Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs mobilize many types of resources from 
their network members. The Chinese entrepreneurs secure political protection and access    
to state-owned resources, government contracts, subsidies and state media channels for 
advertising from guanxi relationships with government officials. Indeed, most 
entrepreneurs regard bureaucrats as core members of their guanxiwang and stay in close 
contact with them because resources controlled by Chinese officials are vast.
52  
The Russian entrepreneurs obtain various kinds of resources from their svyazi 
networks in similar ways but with two major differences.
53 First, government officials are 
less important in svyazi networks of small entrepreneurs because the central and local 
governments in Russia are poor and much of what was formerly state property, - such as 
factories, mines, oil fields and other state enterprises, - were “grabbed” by oligarch-type 
“entrepreneurs” with the help of corrupt bureaucrats through dubious privatization 
policies.
54 Second, relationships with police, public security organizations, and private 
protection agencies – krysha (roof) - that provide vital protection from the Russian mafia 
and other criminals are core members in Russian entrepreneurs’ networks.
55 
The Dark Side of Social Capital 
Social capital of Chinese and Russian managers and entrepreneurs have both 
bright and dark sides.
56 There is growing empirical evidence in the West that social 
embeddedness has a negative aspect: tightly controlled relationships reinforce social 
obligations and expectations that at times may limit freedom to recognize and exploit 
new opportunities.
57  
The Chinese and Russian entrepreneurs may behave opportunistically in 
relationships since both have little previous experience in managing personal and 
business relationships in market-oriented economic systems. Russian social 
manipulations are blunt and easier to detect whereas Chinese intrigues are indirect and    
hidden. Thus, the Chinese are more skillful in network machinations. Gossip is a vital 
element in both networks, though it is more efficient and severe in Chinese networks. 
Secrecy prevails in both Russian and Chinese cultures and serves as a barrier between 
competing network clusters. Relational favoritism and nepotism is stronger in China 
because the Chinese have inherent propensities to categorize people into closer and 
distant groups and treat them accordingly. The Russians have social categories such as 
svoi (ours) and ne-svoi (not ours) but nepotism in relationships is less severe than in 
China. Social pressures to conform are strong in China and as a result, the Chinese 
“relational trap” is overwhelming and difficult to get out of once someone falls in. The 
Chinese seem to have greater relational inertia and face the negative consequences of 
sticking to the same old ties over an extended period of time. In both countries, informal 
relationships serve as breeding grounds for corruption, bribery and other illegal activities. 
Implications for Western Executives 
  Networking is a way of life in both China and Russia. Therefore, Western 
executives must understand techniques, nuances and limitations of successful networking 
in the two countries. Entrepreneurs and investors should start with basic cultural and 
social knowledge of the two peoples. 
Approaching the Chinese and Russians   
Chinese names are notoriously difficult to pronounce correctly. The Chinese 
usually put surnames first followed by given names, e.g., Wang Tinghao. The Russians 
usually start with their given name followed by father’s name and surname, e.g., Sergei 
Petrovich Ivanov. Correct pronunciation and memorizing of names is a “must” in both 
cultures. Name is regarded as an important attribute of the Chinese filial piety, and    
therefore, ignorant attitude and inappropriate comments on names may be offensive.
58 
Fortunately, many Chinese professionals have English first names. You may come across 
many Jessica Zhangs or Frank Lius. A common mistake of Westerners in China is to treat 
those Chinese who have English names as though they were Westerners. Even if the 
person has an English name and seemingly behaves in Western ways, the Chinese 
entrepreneurs remain quintessential “Confucian merchants” despite the widespread 
influences of modernization and globalization.
59 The Chinese are more pragmatic in 
relationships and multiple identities seem to comfortably “sit” in a person.  
  The Russians are less likely to compartmentalize their personal identities and 
usually do not use English names. Culturally, the Russians prefer to have one identity and 
be consistent in their communications.
60 The downside of this, however, is that the 
Russians may appear less pragmatic and show unnecessary distance in relationships. 
  China and Russia have some of the oldest and enduring cultures and civilizations 
in the world. Accordingly, both peoples are keenly aware of their cultural heritage, and in 
general they are proud cultural patriots. Basic knowledge of two countries’ art, literature, 
music and simple phrases in their languages are likely to smooth out your introductions 
and conversations. Business dress code is not well established in both countries although 
the Chinese and Russians are less formal than the British and humbler than the French 
and Italians in their business attire. 
Establishing enduring and trusted relationships is the first step of entrepreneurial 
success in China and Russia. The Chinese employ the technique called la guanxi, i.e., a 
complex set of recruitment methods, rituals and tricks.
61 The Russians use fewer tricks to 
pull relationships, and tie formation is more spontaneous.
62 In China, it is desirable to    
approach someone through trusted intermediaries, and the chain of relationships may go 
on and on as long as interpersonal trust exists in each connection. The Russian 
entrepreneurs prefer direct tie formation, and if more than one intermediary is involved in 
relationships, it will lose its effectiveness since interpersonal trust is much lower in 
Russia than in China.
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  Both the Russians and Chinese have a strong sense of equality. The Chinese are 
less direct and therefore, you must learn to understand their signals and read “in-between 
the lines”. By contrast, the Russians are more to-the-point and therefore, you should be as 
frank as possible but polite and respectful. Otherwise, the Russians may misinterpret your 
meaning causing undesirable confusion and tension. 
Cultural Context for Socialization 
Although there are a few common appearances, Chinese and Russian food culture 
sets the two nations far apart. Russian food culture resembles European food culture.
64 In 
China, by contrast, it is common to serve donkey or dog for dinner, and therefore, you 
must be able to manage your own culture shock if you come across such banquets. 
Attitudes of a militant animal rights activist certainly will not promote your business 
interests in China. Russian banquets tend to have heavy vodka sessions. Unless you are 
“vodka lover”, you should not “compete” with the Russians since they are legendary in 
holding their liquor.
65 
  Gifts are a must ritual in both countries.
66 The Chinese calculate power and status 
of the receiver crudely and choose gifts accordingly. The higher the status of the receiver 
the greater the value of the gift.
67 The Russians do not make obvious calculations in 
choosing gifts although value of the podarki may signal respect and recognition. In    
China, Westerners must avoid giving any kind of watch since it symbolizes bad luck. In 
Russia, a watch is a desirable gift because it symbolizes the future and good fortune 
according to Russian folk beliefs. 
  A very Russian way of trust building is socializing in traditional Russian banya 
(bathhouse).
68 Arguably, many important decisions in Russia are made in the banya. Irina 
Hakamada, the outspoken Russian female politician and former cabinet minister, once 
famously said: Russian women-politicians will take a real part in decision making only 
when Russian men-politicians end making decisions in banya with beer and girls.
69 For 
those who would like to win deep trust of the Russians, banya is the place to go although 
some Westerners may find it uncomfortable because of its nudity. 
  The Chinese and Russians love informal discussions. However, the Chinese are 
less interested in macro-political and abstract issues such as government policy or 
international conflicts whereas the Russians excel at hot debates about government policy 
or the latest global war on terrorism, though they may have a little knowledge about 
events in their districts or cities. The Russians thus are more global and “politicized” than 
the Chinese who are more local and practical in their learning behaviors. 
 Personal/private  questions  are routinely asked, debated and judged in China and 
Russia. Questions about income, age, marital status, morphology, body and other private 
matters are regarded as “public”, and therefore, one should be prepared to confront such 
questions. The Russians are more “private” than the Chinese. How much information you 
would like to disclose is up to you but certain signals and gestures to avoid intrusive 
questions are desirable to establish a balance. In general, Russians will not ask questions 
about age and marital status; in particular, Russian women will not tolerate such    
discussions. By contrast, the Chinese regard asking personal questions as indicators of 
care and warmth in relationships. 
  The Russians are more expressive in communications and expressing sincerely 
one’s feelings is regarded as appropriate and desirable. The Chinese regard open displays 
of emotions as unbalanced and prefer the “emotional golden mean”. 
Managing relational problems also contrasts the two cultures. Chinese guanxi 
work better in stable conditions when times are good. However, guanxi mechanisms are 
less effective in crisis situations because guanxi exchanges are indirect, highly ritualistic 
and inefficient. Cultural dispositions of the Chinese are more feminine, harmony and 
peace loving, and they shy away from open confrontations.
70 Guanxi is a good 
mechanism for managing up-side growth but lacks tricks and techniques useful in 
problem situations. The Chinese are less prepared and able to work in conflict situations 
than the Russians. 
  On the contrary, Russian svyazi function better in urgent situations when one 
needs direct and efficient communications without rituals. In this sense, svyazi 
relationships require less effort during crisis than guanxi. Cultural dispositions of the 
Russians are masculine, less compromising and able to bear conflicts and fights, and as a 
result, svyazi relationships are efficient channels for managing down-side problems.
71 
Communications and Negotiations 
The main business language is likely to be English in both countries. The 
Russians speak better English but the linguistic barrier is often a headache in both 
countries. The Chinese and Russians are not as reliant on email as North-Americans, 
though frequent communications are “must” tricks in relationship maintenance. It is    
practical to be tolerant of their English mistakes, and desirable to send properly written 
messages so that the other side learns something, which may ultimately facilitate your 
business communications. The Chinese and Russians regard emails as correspondence 
between two individuals with their identities rather than sending emails to a message 
board.  Therefore, basics of e-manners should be followed. Messages that are acceptable 
in the West may be perceived disrespectful in Russia or too direct in China.  
  Specific entrepreneurial issues might be addressed through effective networking 
strategies and tactics. Western venture capitalists, joint venture partners, and 
suppliers/customers should try to establish certain cognitive and interpersonal trust with 
their Chinese and Russian counterparts as soon as sides are serious about doing business. 
Understanding each other’s mental models, decision making styles, and personalities may 
facilitate business negotiations. Conducting due diligence on the ability, experience, 
honesty, trustworthiness and intentions of the entrepreneurial team will be easier if you 
have some kind of direct and indirect prior relationships. Due diligence on the social 
capital of your counterparts, i.e., network resources, reputation and informal influence, is 
a vital action to take in the cultures where “whom you know” and “who knows you” 
often decide one’s entrepreneurial destinations. Clear informal rules and expectations on 
involvement, support, and information disclosures will be helpful to avoid confusions and 
conflicts in interactions. 
  Value negotiations are painstaking both in Russia and China. Private equity 
valuation methods and accounting practices are primitive. The Chinese and Russians 
excel at creative accounting, and financial statements are full of “surprises” and 
inconsistencies. Trusted relationships may help you to get accurate information. The    
Chinese are patient negotiators who like to ramble, and therefore, you may come across 
many different meanings of the same thing in different times and conditions.
72 The 
Chinese are likely to make many forward and backward moves, and in this way, they are 
verifying their understanding of your positions and postures. The Russians are 
straightforward, and do not mind scenes and scandals in negotiations although there are a 
whole set of sophisticated techniques that they inherited from the Soviet days.
73 Both the 
Chinese and Russians are tough negotiators and do not like to make too many 
concessions. 
Conclusion 
The above descriptions are generalizations about the Chinese and Russian 
entrepreneurs as “cultural” groups from the perspective that culture is the collective 
programming of the mind, which distinguishes the members of one category of people 
from those another.
74 However, networking behaviors and strategies of entrepreneurs will 
be different within one country contingent upon industry, region, age, gender, ethnicity, 
education, Western experience, and other factors. Therefore, the most effective network 
building and maintaining strategy for Western executives in China and Russia is to craft 
strategies and tactics that reflect both general network parameters and unique 
characteristics of the business counterpart. 
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